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VOLUME 19 FALL, 1964 NUMBER 1
LIABILITY FOR AIRCRAFT NOISE-THE AFTERMATH
OF CAUSBY AND GRIGGS
JAMES D. HILL'
The advent of manned aircraft has been charged with responsibility
for causing radical revision of many aspects of our society-from con-
cepts of time and distance to modes of warfare. Of interest to lawyers
is its impact upon the venerable Roman law maxim, cujus est solum ejus
est usque ad coelum.2
The coming of the air age necessarily doomed, for all time, the
ancient concept of property law that ownership of real property included
the airspace above it to the ultimate reaches of the sky. The intellectual
problems which have been posed to legal scholars and jurists, their
struggles to find an accommodation, the new concepts which ultimately
emerged, and their definition and refinement in recent litigation all
present an interesting study of the vitality of our legal system, and of its
ability to adjust rights and obligations to meet the needs of a changing
society.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "RIGHT OF FLIGHT"
Its origins lost in the mists of antiquity,3 the maxim has been im-
bedded in the common law since Lord Coke, who wrote:
1. Mr. Hill served in the Federal Government as Special Assistant to the Attorney
General, Chief Legal Advisor of the Office of Alien Property, Special Counsel to the Post
Office Department, and Deputy General Counsel, Federal Aviation Agency. He is now
engaged in private practice in Washington, D.C., and is a lecturer on Transportation Law,
The Graduate School of Public Law, George Washington University.
2. "Whose is the soil, his it is up to the sky."
3. Although the maxim is generally referred to as one of "Roman Law," legal historians
state that it cannot be found in Roman law and that, to the contrary, the Institutes of
Justinian provide that that air is common to all mankind. The maxim cannot be traced
beyond Accursius, who lived in Bologna, 1182-1260, and who published a Roman Law
commentary at about 1250. Bouv6 states that Accursius' son, Franciscus, also a Roman-law
scholar, was brought to England by Edward I, as an aide, and that he also lectured at
Oxford. He remained in England from 1273 to 1281, and then returned to his post at the
University of Bologna. Bouv6, Private Ownership of Airspace, 1 AiR L. REV. 232, 243-248
(1930). See also, Fitzgerald, Real Property-Horizontal Land Concepts, 24 U. KAN. CITy L.
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And lastly, the earth hath in law a great extent upwards, not
only of water, as hath been said, but of ayre, and all other
things even up to heaven; for cujus est solum ejus est usque
ad coelum, as is holden. ....
The property-owner's dominion of the column of airspace above
his property was thereafter, for centuries, affirmed in a variety of land-
based situations, affording him a remedy against overhanging eaves and
cornices, 5 projecting buildings,' walls, 7 overhanging branches,8 telephone
crossarms and wires,9 the shooting of guns,' ° and even from thrusting
arms or being kicked by a horse."
Clearly, this concept of property rights is incompatible with air
transportation. As early as 1815, Lord Ellenborough observed:' 2
REv. 196 (1956); Hugin, Airspace Rights and Liabilities as Affected by Aircraft Operation,
26 NOTRE DAME LAW. 620 (1951); Klein, Cujus Est Solum Ejus Est . .. Quousque Tandem,
26 J. AR. L. & Cow. 237 (1959); Sweeney, Adjusting the Conflicting Interests of Land-
owner and Aviator in Anglo-American Law, 3 J. AIR. L. 329 (1932).
The maxim thereafter became a part of the common law. See Bury v. Pope, Cro. Eliz.
118, 78 Eng. Rep. 375 (Q.B. 1587), attributing the maxim to the time of Edward I. The
maxim is also contained in the codes of many other countries. See R NE, AIRPORTS AND THE
CoURTs 95 n.38 (1944); Eatman, Ownership of Airspace in Louisiana, 8 LA. L. REv. 118
(1947); Eubank, The Doctrine of the Airspace Zone of Effective Possession, 12 B.U.L. Rxv.
414 (1932). To the contrary, see the excellent article by Rev. Francesco Lardone, Associate
Professor of Roman Law, Catholic University, arguing persuasively that control of super-
adjacent airspace inhered in ownership of the land below in Roman law. Lardone, Airspace
Rights in Roman Law, 2 Am L. REv. 455 (1931).
4. 1 COKE, LITTLETON § 1, at 4 (Day ed. 1812), citing from the Year Books 14 Henry
VIII 12; 22 Henry VI 59; 10 Edward IV 14. See also 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 118;
3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 1217.
5. Harrington v. McCarthy, 169 Mass. 492, 48 N.E. 278 (1897); Smith v. Smith, 110
Mass. 302 (1872); Wilmarth v. Woodcock, 58 Mich. 482, 25 N.W. 475 (1885); Lawrence v.
Hough, 35 N.J. Eq. 371 (1882); Aiken v. Benedict, 39 Barb. 400 (N.Y. 1863); Crocker v.
Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 61 App. Div. 226, 70 N.Y. Supp. 492 (1901); Hahl v. Sugo, 46
App. Div. 632, 61 N.Y. Supp. 770 (1899); Young v. Thedieck, 8 Ohio Ct. App. 103 (1918);
Mayer v. Flynn, 46 Utah 598, 150 Pac. 962 (1915); Huber v. Stark, 124 Wis. 359, 102 N.W.
12 (1905) ; Fay v. Prentice, 1 C.B. 828, 135 Eng. Rep. 769 (C.P. 1845).
6. Murphy v. Bolger, 60 Vt. 723, 15 At. 365 (1888); Corbett v. Hill, [1870] L.R. 9
Eq. 671; Penruddock's Case 3 Co. Rep. 205 (1957); Baten's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 53(b), 77
Eng. Rep. 810 (K.B. 1611).
7. Barnes v. Berendes, 139 Cal. 32, 69 Pac. 491, modified, 72 Pac. 406 (1902) ; Norwalk
Heating & Lighting Co. v. Vernam, 75 Conn. 662, 55 Ati. 168 (1903); Langfeldt v. McGrath,
33 Ill. App. 158 (1889); Codman v. Evans, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 431 (1863); Lyle v. Little,
83 Hun 532, 33 N.Y. Supp. 8 (1895).
8. Grandona v. Lovdal, 70 Cal. 161, 11 Pac. 623 (1886); Tanner v. Wallbrunn, 77
Mo. App. 262 (1898); Ackerman v. Ellis, 81 N.J.L. 1, 79 At. 883 (1911); Countryman v.
Lighthill, 24 Hun 405 (N.Y. 1881).
9. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Barnes, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 1290, 101 S.W. 301 (Ct. App.
1907); Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716 (1906).
10. Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 250 U.S. 1 (1918); Whit-
taker v. Stangvick, 100 Minn. 386, 111 N.W. 295 (1907); Herrin v. Sutherland, 74 Mont.
587, 241 P. 328 (1925) ; Clifton v. Bury, 4 T.L.R. 8 (Q.B. 1887).
11. Hannabalson v. Sessions, 116 Iowa 457, 90 N.W. 93 (1902); Ellis v. Loftus Iron
Co., [1874] L.R. 10 C.P. 10.
12. Pickering v. Rudd, 4 Camp. 219, 220, 171 Eng. Rep. 70, 71 (N.P. 1815).
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But I am by no means prepared to say that firing across a field
in vacuo, no part of the contents touching it, amounts to a
clausum fregit, Nay, if this board overhanging the plaintiff's
garden be a trespass, it would follow that an aeronaut is liable
to an action of trespass quare clausum fregit at the suit of
the occupier of every field over which his balloon passes in the
course of his voyage.
Thereafter, as long range artillery and flight in free balloons brought
an awakening to the realization that a new dimension had been added
to the earth, namely, airspace beyond the immediate reaches of the land,
other voices were raised to question the literal wording of the Roman
maxim. In 1865 Lord Blackburn said, "I understand the good sense of
[Lord Ellenborough's] doubt, though not the legal reason of it,"' 8 and
in 1884 Sir William Brett, M.R., said that usque ad coelum "to my mind
is another fanciful phrase.' 4 Sir Frederick Pollock thought that an
entry above the land, though touching no part of it, was a trespass,
"unless indeed it can be said that the scope of possible trespass is limited
by that of possible effective possession, which might be the most reason-
able rule." 5 Sir John Salmond"8 thought such a passage was not a tres-
pass, since
such an extension of the rights of a landowner would be an un-
reasonable restriction of the right of the public to the use of the
atmospheric space above the earth's surface. It would make it
an actionable wrong to fly a kite, or send a message by a carrier
pigeon, or ascend in an aeroplane, or fire artillery, even in cases
where no actual or probable damage, danger, or inconvenience
could be proved by the subjacent landowners.
Before 1900, expressions of doubt and suggestions of limitation of
the maxim were both rare and academic. But with the turn of the cen-
tury, the Wright brothers made the aircraft a reality; within a short time
the First World War had converted it from a curiosity of a pre-war age to
a necessity in a modern world. As the infant air transportation industry
struggled for survival and acceptance in the three decades after the war,
courts and lawyers wrestled with the collision between traditional con-
cepts of property rights and the emerging necessity for freedom of the air.
What had previously been an academic legal question became an urgent
problem of great practical importance, as legal writers asked, "Who owns
the airspace?" 7 To those who accepted the Roman maxim literally, a right
13. Kenyon v. Hart, 6 B. & S. 249, 252, 122 Eng. Rep. 1188, 1189 (Q.B. 1865).
14. Wandsworth Bo. of Works v. United Tel. Co., [1884] 13 Q.B.D. 904, 915.
15. POLLOCK, TORTS 362 (13th ed. 1929).
16. SAL OND, TORTS 233 (11th ed. 1953).
17. Eubank, Who Owns the Airspace?, 63 Am. L. REV. 1 (1929); Kingsley & Mangham,
The Correlative Interests of the Landowner and the Airman, 3 J. AIR L. 374 (1932);
MacChesney, Rights of Landowners with Reference to Operation of Aircraft, I J. AiR L.
211 (1930); Niles, The Present Status of the Ownership of Airspace, S ArR L. REV. 132
(1934); Note, 15 MiNN. L. REV. 318 (1931).
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of flight could be created only by federal condemnation, or by constitu-
tional amendment. Federal condemnation of airspace was proposed by
Judge Lamb, Solicitor of the Department of Commerce," and in 1921,
constitutional amendment was urged by Major Elza C. Johnson, Legal
Advisor to the Air Service, who said: 9
The navigation of the air must depend entirely upon the ques-
tion of who owns the space above the earth. If the common law
rule is recognized, that the space above the earth belongs to the
owner of the earth, then no power exists in the Constitution of
either state or nation to deprive the individual owner of any
rights to the free use and occupancy of that space as long as he
does not molest the private ownership of his neighbor. No one
has any right to cross his property with an airplane and trespass
upon his right to enjoy without danger or fear of danger ...
It would appear, and is my opinion, that steps should be taken
at once to obtain federal control of the air by direct grant of the
people. I am of the opinion that this must be done before any
rights to use the air exist, notwithstanding the claims to the con-
trary.
At the 1921 meeting of the American Bar Association, its Special
Committee on the Law of Aviation supported the suggestion of a consti-
tutional amendment, saying "we believe that recourse to a constitutional
amendment is desirable . . .," but at the same time expressing great
reservation as to the soundness of Major Johnson's underlying reason for
it. The Committee said:2"
There is no more serious embarrassment to the development of
air navigation than the acceptance of the doctrine as thus
stated. We are not satisfied that it correctly states the actual
condition of the law. . . . We submit that it should be the law
that it is not an invasion of private right to utilize the air over
land for passage by flight, if such flight is accomplished without
jeopardizing any right heretofore usually beneficially enjoyed in
the ownership of the land; and that the rights of ownership are
those benefits which have hitherto been commonly recognized as
incident to such ownership. We feel that this committee can do
no more beneficial service to the public and the common inter-
18. McCracken, Air Law, 57 Am. L. REv. 97 (1923); Trabue, The Law of Aviation, 58
Am. L. REV. 65 (1924). See McLendon, Aviation and the Law of Trespass, 1 U. KAN. CITy
L. REV. 10 (1932); Williams, The Existence of the Right of Flight, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 729
(1931).
19. 2 Air Service Information Circular 13 (1921). See also, Cuthell, Development of
Aviation Laws in the United States, I AIa L. REV. 86, 88 (1930) ; Eubank, The Doctrine of
the Airspace Zone of Effective Possession, 12 B.UL. REV. 414 (1932); Harriman, Navigable
Airspace and Property Rights, 1 J. AI L. 346 (1930) ; Logan, The Nature of the Right of
Flight, 1 AI L. REV. 94 (1930); Zollmann, Airspace Rights, 53 Am. L. REV. 711 (1919);
Note, 3 J. AIm L. 293 (1932).
20. 46 A.B.A. REP. 498, 515 (1921).
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ests of all of our people than to challenge the proposition that it
is an invasion of the rights of private ownership of property to
utilize air for purposes of flight.
The following year, at its 1922 meeting, the Committee withdrew its
recommendation for a constitutional amendment.'
While some writers joined Major Johnson in believing that the
ancient maxim was applicable to flight,22 this was the minority view.
Legal writers mounted an assault on the absolutism, pedigree and intent
of the maxim. Some analyzed the more than one hundred cases to point
out that in only a few had the maxim actually been accepted without
reservation.' Others engaged in historical research designed to prove
that the maxim was never in fact a Roman law concept.24 It was also
argued that the maxim had never been applied to trespasses above the
immediate reaches of the land, and that it "should not be extended to
conditions which did not exist and were not conceived of at the time of its
origin."' 25 The maxim was termed "absurd."26 Others discoursed on the
fallibility of maxims generally, describing them as a "substitute for
thought ... a dangerous short cut . . . a slogan .... ."' Professor Bogert
said :28
But notwithstanding the persistence of [the] rule, its applica-
tion to the space not immediately adjacent to the soil and the
structures on the soil is wanting. All the decisions are regarding
intrusions into the space very near the surface, where the actual
use of the soil by the surface occupant was disturbed. It is
21. 47 A.B.A. REP. 413, 415 (1922).
22. Carthew, Aviation, Its Future and Legal Problems, 63 SOL. J. 418 (1919) ; Couture,
The Michigan Statute Regulating Aerial Navigation is Void Insofar as it is in Derogation of
Vested Rights, 11 Bi-Mo. L. REV. 159 (1928); Hine, Home versus Aeroplane, 16 A.B.A.J.
217 (1930) ; Hise, Ownership and Sovereignty of the Air or Air Space Above Landowner's
Premises with Special Reference to Aviation, 16 IowA L. REV. 169 (1931); Meyer, Trespass
by Aeroplane, 36 L. MAO. & REV. 20 (1911); Platt, The Airship as a Trespasser, 7 Oao
L. REV. 402 (1909); Williams, Law of the Air, 131 L. T. 403 (1911).
23. Sweeney, Adjusting the Conflicting Interests of Landowner and Aviator in Angle-
American Law, 3 J. AIR L. 531 (1932).
24. Baldwin, The Law of the Air-Ship, 4 Am. J. INT'L L. 95 (1910); Bouv6, Private
Ownership of Airspace, I AIR L. REV. 232 (1930); Sweeney, Adjusting the Conflicting
Interests of Landowner and Aviator in Anglo-American Law, 3 J. AIR L. 531 (1932).
25. Bouv6, Private Ownership of Airspace, 1 Am L. REV. 376 (1930); Clifford, The
Beginnings of a Law for the Air, 7 WAsH. L. REV. 216 (1931); Jome, Property in the Air,
62 Am. L. REV. 887 (1928); Kuhn, The Beginnings of an Aerial Law, 4 Am. J. INT'L L.
109, 126 (1910); Logan, Aviation and the Maxim Cujus Est Solum, 16 ST. Louis L. REV.
303 (1931); Logan, The Nature of the Right of Flight, 1 AIR L. REV. 94 (1930); Zollman,
Airspace Rights, 53 Am. L. REV. 711 (1919); Note, 1 AIR L. REV. 272 (1930); Note, 16
CORNELL L.Q. 119 (1930); Note, 32 HAav. L. REV. 569 (1919); Annot., 42 A.L.R. 945
(1926).
26. Bouv, Private Ownership of the Airspace, 1 AIR L. REV. 232, 251 (1930); Note,
40 YALE L.J. 131 (1930).
27. McNair, The Beginnings and the Growth of Aeronautical Law, 1 J. AIR L. 383, 387
(1930); Note, 3 BROOKLYN L. REV. 350 (1933); Note, 9 TaxAs L. REV. 240 (1931).
28. Bogert, Problems in Aviation Law, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 271, 296 (1921).
19641
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
believed that an examination of the cases will show that cujus
est solum is not law, but is merely a nice theory, easily passed
down from medieval days because there has not been until
recently any occasion to apply it to its full extent.
Both the Congress and state legislatures acted promptly in an at-
tempt to solve the problem. In 1922 the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws adopted a "Uniform State Law for Aero-
nautics," which provided:2 9
Sec. 3. Ownership of Space. The ownership of the space above
the lands and waters of this state is declared to be vested in the
several owners of the surface beneath, subject to the right of
flight described in Section 4.
Sec. 4. Lawfulness of flight. Flight in aircraft over the lands and
waters of this state is lawful unless at such a low altitude as to
interfere with the then existing use to which the land or water
or space over the land or water is put by the owner, or unless so
conducted as to be eminently dangerous to persons or property
lawfully on the land or water beneath.
The Uniform Act ultimately was adopted by 22 states.30 But its
apparent adherence to the ad coelum maxim, subject only to a right of
flight, produced controversy.3 In 1932, at a joint meeting of represent-
atives Of the American Bar Association and of the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, "the conferees reached the conclusion that the
statement of ownership of airspace, heretofore contained in the Uniform
State Law of Aeronautics, was no longer justified ... ."' After enact-
ment of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, and the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938, the matter became academic, and in 1943 the Commissioners
formally withdrew the act. 3
In 1926, the Congress enacted the Air Commerce Act, which pro-
vided: 4
Sec. 10. NAVIGABLE AIRSPACE. As used in this Act, the term
"navigable airspace" means airspace above the minimum safe
29. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM4
STATE LAWS 166 (1928).
30. Ariz., Del., Ga., Idaho, Ind., Md., Mich., Minn., Mo., Mont., Neb., N.J., N.C.,
N.D., Pa., R.I., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Utah, Vt., Wis.
31. See RHYNE, Airports and the Courts 109-12 (1944); Fagg, Airspace Ownership and
the Right of Flight, 3 J. Am L. 400 (1932); Hayden, Airspace Property Rights Under the
New Aeronautical Code, 4 AIR L. REV. 31 (1933); Hayden, Objections to the New Uniform
Aeronautical Code, 18 A.B.A.J. 121 (1932) ; Sweeney, Adjusting the Conflicting Interests
of Landowner and Aviator in Anglo-American Law, 3 J. Am L. 531, 582-85 (1932).
32. Logan, Proposed Uniform Aeronautical Code: Ideas of Two Committees Harmo-
nized, 3 J. Am L. 285-86 (1932) ; Report of the Standing Committee on Aeronautical Law,
56 A.B.A. REP. 69, 317 (1931), 57 A.B.A. REP. 138, 368 (1932).
33. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS 66-67 (1943).
34. Ch. 344, § 10, 44 Stat. 574, as amended, ch. 601, § 1107(h), 52 Stat. 1028 (1938).
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altitudes of flight prescribed by the Secretary of Commerce
under section 3, and such navigable' airspace shall be subject to
a public right of freedom of interstate and foreign air naviga-
tion, in conformity with the requirements of this Act.
Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary of Commerce set the floor of
navigable airspace at 1000 feet over the congested parts of cities, towns
and settlements, and 500 feet elsewhere.85
Thus, since 1926, the United States has limited for domestic pur-
poses a property owner's interest in the column of airspace above his
property. Although the 1926 act has since been succeeded by the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, and it in turn by the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, the 1926 provision remains, and has been broadened.86 The origi-
nal section, which created a public right of "interstate and foreign" air
navigation87 was amended by the 1938 act to embrace all flights in "air
commerce," which was defined as88
interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce or the transporta-
tion of mail by aircraft or any operation or navigation of air-
craft within the limits of any civil airway or any operation or
35. Now § 91.79, Federal Air Regulations, 28 F.R. 6702, which reads:
Except when necessary for takeoff or landing, no person may operate an aircraft
below the following altitudes:
(a) Anywhere. An altitude allowing, if a power unit fails, an emergency landing
without undue hazard to persons or property on the surface.
(b) Over congested areas. Over any congested area of a city, town, or settlement,
or over any open air assembly of persons, an altitude of 1000 feet above the
highest obstacle within a horizontal radius of 2000 feet of the aircraft.
(c) Over other than congested areas. An altitude of 500 feet above the surface
except over open water or sparsely populated areas. In that case, the aircraft
may not be operated closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or
structure.
(d) Helicopters. Helicopters may be operated at less than the minimums prescribed
in paragraph (b) or (c) of this section if the operation is conducted without
hazard to persons or property on the surface. In addition, each person operating
a helicopter shall comply with routes or altitudes specifically prescribed for
helicopters by the Administrator.
36. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, §§ 1(24), 3, 52 Stat. 977, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301
(24), 1304 (1958).
37. It is doubtful whether the public right of flight was in fact limited to interstate
flights by the 1926 act. The "navigable airspace," in which such right existed, was to be
established by the Secretary of Commerce under his authority to establish air traffic rules,
and the Congress expressly intended these to embrace intrastate flights as well. The original
Senate bill would have limited federal regulation to interstate flights, and "intrastate flying
is left to the control of the states." S. REP. No. 2, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1925). However,
in conference the Senate receded from this and agreed to regulation of both intrastate and
interstate flight. The conference report stated that:
In order to protect and prevent undue burdens upon interstate and foreign air
commerce the air traffic rules are to apply whether the aircraft is engaged in
commercial or noncommercial, or in foreign, interstate, or intrastate naviga-
tion. . . ." (67 CONG. REC. 9390 (1926).)
The act was so construed in Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 35 F.2d 761
(N.D. Ohio 1929). And any remaining doubt as to a grant of right of flight for intrastate
flights was resolved by the broadening amendment of the 1938 act, discussed above.
38. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 608, § 1(3), 52 Stat. 977, reenacted 49 U.S.C.
§ 1301(4) (1958).
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navigation of aircraft which directly affects, or which may
endanger safety in, interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce.
The courts have construed air commerce as including purely local
intrastate flights within the scope of the act as they may penetrate a
federal airway, or endanger the safety of interstate flights. 9 Today, the
congressional grant of a right of flight, within the navigable airspace as
established by regulations issued under the act, exists in favor of all
flights, including those which, under older concepts, would be regarded
as purely intrastate and hence beyond the scope of federal regulation.
As a result, the similar provisions of the Uniform State Law for Aeron-
autics, applicable to intrastate flight, are no longer necessary as a sup-
plement to federal legislation.4 °
Moreover, the original grant of the right of flight, limited to enroute
flight above the floor of navigable airspace, was broadened by the 1958
act to include "airspace needed to insure safety in takeoff and landing of
aircraft."'" Before the 1958 amendment, which extended the right of
freedom of transit to the airspace necessary for take-off and landing, a
number of courts enjoined such flight at altitudes of less than 500 feet on
complaint of the subjacent landowner.42 While the 1958 amendment
granting a right of flight through lower airspace does not affect the sub-
jacent owner's rights to compensation, as will be discussed later, it did
create a "privilege" for such flight, immunizing it from injunction.
Further, since the 1926 act as broadened by the 1938 and 1958 acts pre-
empted the field of air traffic control, it also immunized flight in the
navigable airspace from restrictive "anti-noise" state laws and municipal
regulations ."
39. Rosenhan v. United States, 131 F.2d 932 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 790
(1943).
40. Green, The War Against the States in Aviation, 31 VA. L. REV. 835 (1945);
McDonald & Kuhn, The Ocean Air-State or Federal Regulation, 31 VA. L. REV. 363 (1945) ;
Morris, State Control of Aeronautics, 11 J. Am & COM. 320 (1940) ; Rhyne, Federal, State
and Local Jurisdiction Over Civil Aviation, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 459 (1946); Ryan,
Federal and State Jurisdiction over Civil Aviation, 12 J. Am L. & Com. 25 (1941); Wille-
brandt, Federal Control of Air Commerce, 11 J. Am L. & CoM. 205 (1940); Editorial, 12
J. AiR L. & CoM. 68 (1941).
41. Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 101(24), 72 Stat. 737.
42. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932); Vanderslice v.
Shawn, 26 Del. Ch. 225, 27 A.2d 87 (1942); Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20
S.E.2d 245 (1942); Burnham v. Beverly Airways, Inc., 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E.2d 575
(1942); Maitland v. Twin City Aviation Corp., 254 Wisc. 541, 37 N.W.2d 74 (1949). See
generally Johnson v. Curtis Northwest Airplane Co., 1 U.S. Av. 42 (D.C. Minn., 1928);
Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934); Smith v. New England
Aircraft Co., 250 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930) ; Warren Township School Dist. No. 7 v.
City of Detroit, 308 Mich. 460, 14 N.W.2d 134 (1944); Dlugas v. United Air Lines Transp.
Corp., 53 Pa. D. & C. 402 (1944); Sweeney, The Airport as a Nuisance, 4 J. Am L. & CoM.
330 (1933); 20 NOTRE DAME LAW. 441 (1945); 33 NOTRE DAME LAW. 273 (1958).
43. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 132 F. Supp. 871 (E.D.N.Y.
1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956); Calkins, The Landowner and the Aircraft-1938,
25 J. Am L. & CoM. 373 (1958); Seago & Armour, Federal Licensing of Airports, 22
J. Am L. & CoM. 51 (1955); Weibel, Problems of Federalism in the Air Age, 24 J. Am L. &
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"FREEDOM OF THE AnR" IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The question of domestic limitation on property concepts, as it
relates to citizens or the citizen and the state, is separable from the ques-
tion of limitations of territorial sovereignty as between nations. Domestic
limitations are not necessarily the same as international limitations; a
nation may fix territorial boundaries for domestic purposes which are
different from those to which it is bound in its relationships with other
nations. In maritime law, for example, the "three-mile limit" of territorial
waters over which a nation may claim sovereignty into the high seas has
been recognized between nations for centuries. However, our Supreme
Court has recently held44 that for domestic purposes the federal govern-
ment can recognize state sovereignty in excess of three miles. There the
Court rejected the argument that a nation's recognition of the "three-mile
limit" in its dealings with other nations necessarily defines the limits of
maritime territory as between states, or between states and the federal
government. In answer to the argument of the Department of State that
"it had never recognized any boundaries in excess of three miles . ..
[and] by virtue of federal supremacy in the field of foreign relations, the
territorial claims of the States could not exceed that of the Nation," the
Court answered:
We need not decide whether action by Congress fixing a state's
territorial boundary more than three miles beyond its coast con-
stitutes an overriding determination that the State, and there-
fore this country, are to claim that much territory against
foreign nations. It is sufficient for present purposes to note there
is no question of Congress' power to fix state land and water
boundaries as a domestic matter.
Early writers debated not only the question of the appropriate limits
of national airspace as between nations, but also whether any limits
should exist at all. International dispute over the use of balloons in the
Franco-Prussian war focused the attention of legal scholars on the
development of international air law. Some, reverting to the rationale
underlying the maritime "three-mile limit," urged that the limit of
national airspace be the effective range of anti-aircraft gunfire.45 At the
1902 session of the Institut de Droit International at Ghent, the French
CoM. 127, 253 (1957). See Opinion of County Counsel that Board of Supervisors of Los
Angeles County is without authority to regulate jet aircraft noise, in view of federal pre-
emption of the field, and the Cedarhurst decision, 26 J. Ani L. & CoM. 353 (1959). See
Note, 33 NOTRE Damr LAW. 273 (1958); Comment, 57 MICH. L. REv. 1214 (1959).
44. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 30-36 (1960), concerning cession of rights to
natural resources beneath the sea, by the Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 29 (1953).
45. See, Kuhn, Airial Flights Above A Three-Mile or Other Vertical Limit by Belliger-
ents Over Neutral Territory 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 104 (1940); Kuhn, The Beginnings of an
Aerial Law, 4 AM. J. INT'L L. 109 (1910); Lee, Freedom of the Air in the United States,
25 AM. J. INT'L L. 238, 246 (1931); Williams, Developments in Aerial Law, 75 U. PA. L.
REv. 139 (1926).
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jurist, Paul Fauchille, submitted a proposal for international "freedom of
the air." At the 1906 meeting of the Institute, England's Professor West-
lake argued in favor of an opposing resolution which would reject free-
dom of the air in favor of national sovereignty, but the proposal was
defeated in favor of Fauchille's doctrine.46 However, in 1908 a number of
German military balloons carrying military personnel landed in France,
and in 1909 Bleriot flew the English Channel. These events revived an
interest in national sovereignty in airspace and in 1910 the French gov-
ernment, alarmed by the German invasions of French airspace, called an
international air navigation conference in Paris. Nineteen European
governments attended, and a convention was drafted, complete except for
articles dealing with national sovereignty in airspace. Cooper 47 writes
that all delegations supported the principle of national sovereignty, as
opposed to the doctrine of "freedom of the air," but that the conference
broke down over conflicting political considerations concerning the
restrictions which a State should be permitted to impose on the aircraft
of another. The conference adjourned to permit further examination of
the problem by each government; however, efforts to reconcile the differ-
ences of opinion were unavailing and it was never called back into session.
The First World War signaled a change, as the belligerent powers
became convinced of the paramount need of national security in over-
lying airspace. The Paris Peace Conference established an Aeronautical
Commission, charged with preparation of a Convention on the Regulation
of Aerial Navigation. The Convention was opened for signature on
October 13, 1919, and was ultimately ratified by 33 nations, though not
by the United States. The convention completely rejected the "freedom of
the air" concept, providing:
Article 1. The High Contracting Parties recognize that every
Power has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace
above its territory. 8
In the United States, some argued that it was contrary to the interests
of the United States, as a pioneer in air transportation, to support a
national right to inhibit freedom of innocent passage at any height.4 9
Others argued that
46. Hershey, The International Law of Aerial Space, 6 Am. J. INT'L L. 381 (1912);
Lee, Sovereignty of the Air, 7 Am. J. INT'L L. 470 (1913).
47. See, Cooper, The International Air Navigation Conference, Paris, 1910, 19 J. Au
L. & Com. 127 (1952); Lee, Sovereignty of the Air, 7 Am. J. INT ' L. 470 (1913); Young,
The Aerial Inspection Plan and Air Space Sovereignty, 24 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 565 (1956).
48. 1 HuDsoN, INTERNNATIONAL LEGISrArION 359, 363 (1931) ; S. Doc. No. 91, 66th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1919); 11 L.N.T.S. 173 (1922). See generally English, Air Freedom: The Second
Battle of the Books, 2 J. Au L. 356 (1931); Hudson, Aviation and International Law,
1 Am L. REv. 183 (1930); Kuhn, International Aerial Navigation and the Peace Conference,
14 Am. J. INT'L L. 369 (1920); Lee, The International Flying Convention and the Freedom
of the Air, 33 HARv. L. REV. 23 (1919); Rhyne, Legal Rules for International Aviation, 31
VA. L. REV. 267 (1945).
49. Lee, Freedom of the Air in the United States, 25 Am. J. INT'L L. 238, 246 (1931).
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it is essential to the safety of sovereign States that they possess
jurisdiction to control the airspace above their territories. It
seems to us to rest on the obvious practical necessity of self-
protection. Every government completely sovereign in character
must possess power to prevent from entering its confines those
whom it determines to be undesirable. 50
In 1926 the Congress enacted the Air Commerce Act which, unilat-
erally, adhered to the position of the Paris Convention and rejected the
doctrine of international "freedom of the air," with the declaration:
The Congress hereby declares that the Government of the United
States has, to the exclusion of all foreign nations, complete
sovereignty of the airspace over the lands and waters of the
United States .... 51
The same view was again adopted in the International Convention
on Civil Aviation-the so-called "Chicago Convention" of 1944 in which
the signatory nations agreed that "every State has complete and exclu-
sive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.""2
However, any thought that this agreement finally terminated the
controversy over international "freedom of the air" died with the advent
of space travel. Today diplomats and legal scholars are again concerned
with the problem of limitations of sovereignty in airspace. On December
20, 1961, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted
Resolution 1721, which
1. Commends to States for their guidance in the exploration and
use of outer space the following principles:
(a) International law, including United Nations Charter,
applies to outer space and celestial bodies:
(b) Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and
use by all States in conformity with international law, and are
not subject to national appropriation. . .. "
Although this resolution recognizes the principle of freedom of outer
space, it does not define the altitude at which national airspace ends, and
free outer space begins. The solution of this question remains for future
decision. It is a question peculiarly for diplomatic, rather than legal,
decision. "It is clear that this point or line in space cannot be determined
by legal opinion of the bench or bar-but can only be arrived at by inter-
national acquiescence-either by word or deed.1
5 4
50. Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930).
51. Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, § 6, 44 Stat. 572.
52. 61 Stat. 1180 (1944).
53. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFP. REC. 16th Sess. Plenary 1085 (A/RES 1721 (xvi)) (1961).
54. Address by Major General Albert M. Kuhfeld, Judge Advocate General, USAF,
before the Association of General Counsel, in Phoenix, Arizona, Nov. 18, 1960.
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Various suggestions as to the appropriate limit of national sover-
eignty in airspace have been advanced. They include:"
1. Height to which aircraft can attain by aerodynamic lift (25
miles)
2. Height at which centrifugal force takes over (52 miles)
3. Altitude of orbiting satellites (100-600 miles)
4. Height at which the earth's gravitational effect is lost (60
miles)
5. Height at which no molecules of gaseous air are found
(between 1000 and 10,000 miles)
6. Height at which the subjacent state cannot effectively exer-
cise sovereignty
7. Height without limit
8. Finally, Major General Albert M. Kuhfeld, Judge Advocate
General, USAF, has recently suggested that "the particular
activity in space rather than distance from the earth, is what
primarily concerns a subjacent state."5
The attitude of the nations at the present is one of maintaining the
status-quo--or, stated in another way, that the question is not ripe for
decision. The world is now only at the threshold of space exploration. At
this point in the development of space law the nations cannot clearly
perceive where their various national interests, or world interests, will
ultimately lie. The need for self-protection against satellite-spying or
attack is at odds with the obvious advantages of "freedom of the skies."57
And it should not be assumed that it is only the major powers, with inter-
national air-transport interests or space exploration capabilities, who see
advantage to maximum freedom of the airspace; the small land-locked
states have a similar interest.5 Finally, the present state of scientific
knowledge of the subject does not permit rational decision at this time:
55. See generally Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Legal
Problems of Space Exploration, S. Doc. No. 26, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1961) for
the following articles: American Bar Foundation, Report to the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration on the Law of Outer Space, October, 1960; Cooper, High Altitude
Flight and National Sovereignty, 4 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 411 (1951); Knauth, Legal
Problems of Outer Space in Relation to the United Nations, address before the American
Association for the United Nations, Washington, D.C., April 10, 1958; Kuhfeld, supra;
Meyer, Legal Problems of Flight into Outer Space, address delivered before the Third
International Astronautical Congress, Stuttgart, Sept. 5, 1952; P~pin, Legal Problems
Created by the Sputnik, address before the Canadian Bar Association, Nov. 6, 1957;
Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 50th Annual Meeting, April 26,
1956; Schachter, A Preview of Space Law Problems Warning: Early Unilateral Positions,
Bar Bulletin, New York County Lawyers Assn., June, 1958, pp. 33-36; Yeager & Stark,
Decatur's "Doctrine"-A Code for Outer Space?, United States Naval Institute Proceedings,
Sept., 1957, pp. 931-937.
56. Kuhfeld, Across the Space Threshold, 4 JAG BULL. 3, 9 (1962).
57. Senator Albert Gore, To Rule Space: Law or Might?, N.Y. TEMEs, Nov. 10, 1963
(Magazine), p. 23.
58. See Lee, The International Flying Convention and the Freedom of the Air, 33 HARV.
L. RE V. 23, 34 (1919).
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What is the make-up of space? What types of vehicles will ulti-
mately use it? To what purposes will it be devoted? Are the uses
of space going to be primarily of military value-or will they be
primarily of commercial benefit? These are but a few of the
questions which must be answered before lawmakers can legis-
late wisely in the field of space law. We must all fully realize,
therefore, that we are being distinctly premature if we attempt
to set up or to propose specific rules of space law at this early
stage ...
The lawmakers wait only for the physical facts of space to be
supplied by the explorers, the scientists, the mathematicians,
and the physicist. With the physical facts in hand, we can at-
tempt to set the upper limits of national sovereignty."'
This situation has led legislators, diplomats and legal scholars to
believe that "the absence of any law of Outer Space is, for the time being,
a healthy condition-one which will change, bit by bit, as conflicting
interests arise and are properly weighed in the balance."6 A recent
article summed up the present situation, and possibilities for the near
future, by saying: '
responsible sources have emphasized the prematurity of any
present attempt to codify rules of law for space, and negotia-
tions in the United Nations have led only to the appointment of
a study group. . . . In the light of such reluctance to formulate
prescriptive rules, proposals for an immediate international con-
vention on the law of space seem unrealistic. . . .The factors
which have heretofore precluded an order for space may be
expected to postpone its emergence for an indefinite future
period. So long as the values and uses of space remain uncertain
and the difficulties of implementing basic ordering rules are
unresolved, it will continue to be premature to affirm, deny, or
otherwise define sovereign rights.
THE Causby DECISION
To return to the development of United States domestic law, the
declaration contained in the Air Commerce Act of 1926 was a legal step
forward of great significance, modifying an ancient concept of property
law. It cut through a legal knot which threatened to impede the develop-
ment of air commerce. It created new rights and liabilities which the
courts are still assessing and refining.
59. Rear Admiral Chester Ward, Judge Advocate General, U.S.N., Projecting the Law
of the Sea Into the Law of Space, JAG J. (March 1957).
60. Senator Kenneth B. Keating, address before the IX Annual Congress of the Inter-
national Astronautical Federation, in The Hague, Netherlands, August 29, 1958.
61. NOTE, National Sovereignty of Outer Space, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1154 (1961). See also
Cooper, Legal Problems of Upper Space, 23 J. Ant L. & Com. 308 (1956); Craig, National
Sovereignty at High Altitudes, 24 J. Ant L. & Com. 384 (1957).
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The courts were quick to seize upon the Congressional declaration
by denying injunctions against flight at altitudes in excess of 500 feet. 2
Some declared a limitation on ownership of airspace without reference to
the congressional declaration;63 one court was more specific, saying that
"the question is unaffected by the regulation promulgated by the Depart-
ment of Commerce under the Air Commerce Act of 1926 . . . for in our
view that regulation does determine the rights of the surface owner .... 64
But whether in reliance on the Air Commerce Act, or as a matter of
independent judicial decision, the state courts and lower federal courts
were unanimous in concluding that the ancient maxim, cujus est solum
ejus est usque ad coelum, had yielded to some extent to the air age. Their
unanimity, however, was not the end of. the matter; indeed, it raised even
more questions than it solved.
Writers6" exhaustively debated the exact nature of the change
worked by the Air Commerce Act, compared the Uniform State Law and
the Restatement of Torts,66 and weighed the relative merits of the differ-
ing theories utilized by the courts in Smith v. New England Aircraft Co.,
67
Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp.,68 and Hinman v. Pacific Air Trans-
port.9 To what extent must the ancient maxim give way? What were
now the relative rights of the aviator and the property-owner? What
remedies existed to vindicate these rights? These questions ultimately
came before the Supreme Court in United States v. Causby.7o Two years
previously, in Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota71 Justice Jackson had
said:
62. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 41 F.2d 929 (N.D. Ohio 1930); modified 55
F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932) ; Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385
(1930). See also Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d 245 (1942); Burnham v.
Beverly Airways, 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E.2d 575 (1942).
63. Hinman v. Pacific Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936); Thrasher v. City of
Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934).
64. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932). This conclusion was
criticized in Bohlen, Surface Owners and the Right of Flight, 17 MASS. L.Q. 15 (1932).
65. Eubank, The Doctrine of the Airspace Zone of Effective Possession, 12 B.U.L. REv.
414 (1932); Godehn, Brophy, Butler & Hale, Proposed Law of Airftight, 9 J. Am L. & Com.
132 (1938); Hackley, Trespassers in the Sky, 21 MiNN. L. REV. 773 (1937); Hayden, Air-
space Property Rights Under the New Aeronautical Code, 4 Am L. REV. 31 (1933); Hayden,
The New Deal in Airspace Rights, 10 J. AIR L. & Com. 158 (1939); Lashbrook, The "Ad
Coelum" Maxim as Applied to Aviation Law, 21 NOTRE DAME LAW. 143 (1946); Logan,
Recent Developments in Aeronautical Law, 5 J. AmR L. & CoM. 548 (1934); Rhyne, Federal,
State and Local Jurisdiction Over Civil Aviation, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 459, 478
(1946); Wherry & Condon, Aerial Trespass Under the Restatement of the Law of Torts,
6 Ama L. REv. 113 (1935). See Comments: 22 B.U.L. REV. 625 (1942); 28 CORNELL L.Q.
200 (1943); 6 J. Anm L. & COM. 624 (1935); 30 IOWA L. REV. 70 (1944); 35 MicH. L. REV.
1123 (1937); 15 MINN. L. REV. 318 (1931); 21 MiN. L. REV. 572 (1936).
66. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 159, 194 (1934).
67. 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930).
68. 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932).
69. 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936).
70. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
71. 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
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Aviation has added a new dimension to travel and to our ideas.
The ancient idea that landlordism and sovereignty extend from
the center of the world to the periphery of the universe has been
modified. Today the landowners no more possess a vertical con-
trol of all the air above him than a shore owner possesses a
horizontal control of all the sea before him. The air is too pre-
cious as an open highway to permit it to be "owned" to the
exclusion or embarrassment of air navigation by surface land-
lords who could put it to little real use.
However, this statement was but dictum in a concurring opinion, and was
limited to a recognition that the ancient maxim had been modified. It did
not attempt to meet any of the questions posed by this modification. Such
a role was left to the Court in Causby.
Causby was an action commenced in the court of claims, alleging a
"taking" of property under the fifth amendment. Plaintiff alleged that
army and navy aircraft, operating from an adjacent military base, flew
over his chicken farm at heights as low as eighty-three feet, causing
chickens to fly into the walls in fright, and destroying the use of the
property as a chicken farm. The Court approached the questions pre-
sented by holding first that the ancient Roman maxim must be modified
to meet the necessities of the air age, and that such a modification had
been worked by the language of the Air Commerce Act:
72
It is ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of the land
extended to the periphery of the universe-Cujus est solum ejus
est usque ad coelum. But that doctrine has no place in the
modern world. The air is a public highway, as Congress has
declared. Were that not true, every trans-continental flight
would subject the operator to countless trespass suits. Common
sense revolts at the idea. To recognize such private claims to
the airspace would clog these highways, seriously interfere with
their control and development in the public interest, and trans-
fer into private ownership that to which only the public has a
just claim.
The navigable airspace which Congress has placed in the public
domain is "airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight
prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority."
The airplane is part of the modem environment of life, and the
inconveniences which it causes are normally not compensable
under the Fifth Amendment. The airspace, apart from the
immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain.7 3
Next, the Court considered the extent of the modification, and
defined the new rights and liabilities of the aviator and the property-
72. See Cooper, State Sovereignty v. Federal Sovereignty of Navigable Airspace,
15 J. Am L. & COM. 27 (1948).
73. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, at 260, 263, 266 (1946).
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owner. It could have solved the problem with apparent simplicity and
logic by holding that the subjacent owner's property rights continued
to exist up to, but were completely and arbitrarily terminated at, the
floor of the navigable airspace. As the overflights involved in Causby
occurred in the course of take-offs and landings below the then-defined
floor of navigable airspace, the Court could have upheld the property-
owner's claim on this theory. But the Court avoided this superficial
approach. Instead, it adopted the more elastic standard, suitable to
the varying facts of individual cases and the changes of a developing
science, that "the land-owner, as an incident to his ownership, has a claim
to . . . [airspace] so close to the land that continuous invasion of it
affects the use of the surface of the land itself." 4 On this subject the
Court concluded:
The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land,
is part of the public domain. We need not determine at this time
what those precise limits are. Flights over private land are not
a taking, unless they are so low and so frequent as to be a direct
and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the
land. We need not speculate on that phase of the present case.
For the findings of the Court of Claims plainly establish that
there was a diminution in value of the property and that the
frequent, low-level flights were the direct and immediate cause.
We agree with the Court of Claims that a servitude has been
imposed upon the land.
7 5
When considering the upper limits of a property-owner's interests, it
is important to remember that the 500-1000 foot floor of navigable air-
space was not originally intended by the Secretary of Commerce as a
rule of real property law. The regulation was promulgated pursuant to his
authority to "establish air traffic rules . . . including rules as to safe
altitudes of flight .. ,"" and was in fact promulgated as a safety rule.
In effect, the congressional declaration of a right of flight through the
navigable airspace granted the right in all airspace in which flight was
legal under the rules of the competent regulatory agency. While the rights
of the subjacent property-owner in the column of airspace above his land
were modified by the statutory right of flight, this was not, in the view of
the Supreme Court, an arbitrary outer limit of his property interests.
Indeed, except for the easement for flight, the regulatory floor of naviga-
74. Id. at 265.
75. Id. at 266-67.
76. Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, § 3(e), 44 Stat. 570.
77. See Civil Aeronautics Board, Civil Air Regulations, Interpretations No. 1, 19
Fed. Reg. 4602 1954, stating:
The duty of the Board, under the Act, is primarily to prescribe safe altitudes of
flight, not to proclaim what is navigable airspace. Although navigable airspace has
been defined by the Congress in terms of minimum altitudes, these must be fixed
by the Board solely on the basis of safety.
See Note, 29 Micn. L. REV. 68 (1930).
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ble airspace is legally irrelevant to the subjacent owner's property rights.
As the Supreme Court of Oregon recently observed in Thornburg v. Port
of Portland: 7 8
Whether a plaintiff is entitled to recover should depend upon the
fact of a taking, and not upon an arbitrary rule. The ultimate
question is whether there was a sufficient interference with the
landowner's use and enjoyment to be a taking.
Whatever virtue the establishment of a 500-foot floor under the
cruising flight of aircraft may have as a matter of public safety,
there can be only one sound reason to make it a rule of the law
of real property. That reason ought to be the knowledge, derived
from factual data, that flights above 500 feet do not disturb the
ordinary, reasonable landowner. This may be true. We do not
know that it is. It may well be that only the most sensitive are
offended by such flights. It may equally be true that some of the
aircraft now in use are so disturbing to those on the ground that
500 feet of air will not provide protection to the landowner
below. We are not justified in adopting the 500-foot rule as a
rule of property law in cases of this character merely because
to do so might make our work easier. The trier of fact in each
case is best able to work out the solution. The difficulty was
foreseen in the Causby case.
The wisdom of the Court's refusal in Causby to measure the sub-
jacent property owner's rights by the floor of navigable airspace is
evidenced by the 1958 revision of the definition of "navigable airspace"
to include "airspace needed to insure safety in take-off and landing of
aircraft." 9 Today, not only flight above 500 feet (or 1000 feet over
populated areas) but also flight at any lower altitude, if necessary for
take-off and landing, is privileged. Had the Court terminated the property-
owner's rights at the floor of navigable airspace, the 1958 enlargement of
the term would have curtailed drastically those rights. But, as the Court
made clear, the landowner's claim does not turn on flight at a non-
privileged altitude, but on the fact of damage.
Finally, the Court considered the question of the property owner's
78. 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962). See Aaron v. United States, 311 F.2d 798 (Ct. Cl.
1963). But see Matson v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 283 (Ct. Cl. 1959), an opinion written
by Mr. Justice Reed, who had participated in the Causby decision, in which the court of
claims said:
It would apear from the Causby decision that flights above the 500-foot regulated
ceiling are beyond the reach of the landowner's objection to interference with his
property rights. As to such use, he is in the position of abutting owners along public
highways or railroad rights-of-way. The normal immunity to private actions,
"based upon those incidental and inconveniences that are unavoidably attendant"
upon operations, applies we think to air routes allowable under public authority.
79. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 101(24), 72 Stat. 739. The section now reads:
"Navigable airspace" means airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight
prescribed by regulations issued under this Act, and shall include airspace needed
to insure safety in take-off and landing of aircraft.
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remedy. Before Causby, traditional remedies had proven inadequate.
Actions seeking to enjoin flights over private property, as a nuisance,
were denied on the ground that the annoyance or damage was nominal, s0
that the operation of aircraft, or of airports, was not a nuisance per se,8 '
or that the statutory right of flight created a "legalized nuisance" under
the theory of Richards v. Washington Terminal Co.82 Similarly, an
action for damages for trespass met the defenses that no damages were
proved, that the aircraft did not invade the subjacent owner's column of
airspace, or that the flight was above the minimum altitude of navigable
airspace.83
Causby attempted a new approach, in a new forum, bringing an
action in the court of claims alleging a "taking" of his property. As the
Court said, it was "a case of first impression." 4 The Court upheld his
theory, holding that his rights in the airspace above his land extended to
"as much space above the ground as he can occupy or use . . . ." and
made clear that this included not only space which he could physically
use for erecting a structure or planting trees but also higher altitudes,
invasion of which would interfere with his enjoyment of his property. Any
invasion of this right which diminished the value of his property was a
"taking" compensable under the fifth amendment. The Court said: s5
[T]he airspace is a public highway. Yet it is obvious that if the
landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have
exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping
atmosphere. Otherwise buildings could not be erected, trees
could not be planted, and even fences could not be run. The
principle is recognized when the law gives a remedy in case
overhanging structures are erected on adjoining land. The land-
80. Johnson v. Curtis Northwest Airplane Co., 1 U.S. Av. 61 (D. Minn. 1923); City of
Phoenix v. Harlan, 75 Ariz. 290, 255 P.2d 609 (1953); Smith v. New England Aircraft Co.,
270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930); Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N.E.2d
752 (1947); Kuntz v. Werner Flying Serv., 257 Wis. 405, 43 N.W.2d 476 (1950).
81. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Co., 41 F.2d 929 (N.D. Ohio 1930), modified 55 F.2d
201 (6th Cir. 1932); Dyer v. City of Atlanta, 8 Av. Cas. 18, 175 (Ga. 1964); Meloy v.
City of Santa Monica, 70 Cal. App. 179, 12 P.2d 1072 (3d Dist. 1932); Brooks v. Patterson,
159 Fla. 263, 31 So.2d 472 (1947); Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., supra note 80;
Warren Township School Dist. No. 7 v. Detroit, 308 Mich. 460, 14 N.W.2d 134 (1944);
Crew v. Gallagher, 358 Pa. 541, 58 A.2d 179 (1948) ; Batcheller v. Commonwealth, 176 Va.
109, 10 S.E.2d 529 (1940); 129 MINN. L. REV. 38 (1944); 6 So. CAL. L. REv. 158 (1933);
19 U. PiTT. L. REV. 154 (1957).
82. 233 U.S. 546 (1913). See also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946);
Atkinson v. City of Dallas, 353 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) cert. denied, 370 U.S.
939 (1962).
83. E.g., Hinman v. Pacific Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936); City of Newark v.
Eastern Airlines, 159 F. Supp. 750 (D.N.J. 1958); Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., supra
note 80; Mills v. Orcas Power & Light Co., 56 Wash. 2d 807, 355 P.2d 781 (1960); Cheskov
v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 416, 348 P.2d 673 (1960).
84. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 256 (1946). See also 46 CoLum. L. Rav.
121 (1946); 14 J. ArR L. & Com. 112 (1947); 19 So. CAL. L. REV. 130 (1945); 21 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 92 (1946).
85. United States v. Causby, supra note 84, at 264.
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owner owns at least as much space above the ground as he can
occupy or use in connection with the land. See Hinman v. Pacific
Air Transport, 84 F.2d 755. The fact that he does not occupy it
in a physical sense-by the erection of buildings and the like-
is not material. As we have said, the flight of airplanes, which
skim the surface but do not touch it, is as much an appropriation
of the use of the land as a more conventional entry upon it. We
would not doubt that, if the United States erected an elevated
railway over respondents' land at the precise altitude where its
planes now fly, there would be a partial taking, even though
none of the supports of the structure rested on the land. The
reason is that there would be an intrusion so immediate and
direct as to subtract from the owner's full enjoyment of the
property and to limit his exploitation of it. While the owner does
not in any physical manner occupy that stratum of airspace or
make use of it in the convention sense, he does use it in some-
what the same sense that space left between buildings for the
purpose of light and air is used. The superadjacent airspace at
this low altitude is so close to the land that continuous invasions
of it affect the use of the surface 6f the land itself. We think that
the landowner, as an incident to his ownership, has a claim to it
and that invasions of it are in the same category as invasions of
the surface ...
We need not decide whether repeated trespasses might give rise
to an implied contract. Cf. Portsmouth Co. v. United States,
supra. If there is a taking, the claim is "founded upon the Con-
stitution" and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to
hear and determine. See Hollister v. Benedict Mfg. Co., 113 U.S.
59, 67; Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104; Yearsley v. Ross
Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21.
Thus, a new kind of action was created. The remedy of just com-
pensation for a taking, now popularly referred to as an "inverse con-
demnation,""6 has been frequently utilized since Causby to obtain redress
for diminutions of property values caused by aircraft noise.87 Although
86. Inverse Condemnation is the popular description of a cause of action against a
governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken in
fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power
of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. Thornburg v. Port of
Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 180 n.1, 376 P.2d 100, 101 (1962).
87. Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962); Hopkins v. United States,
173 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. Tex. 1959); Pope v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Tex.
1959) ; Aaron v. United States, 311 F.2d 798 (Ct. Cl. 1963) ; Jensen v. United States, 305
F.2d 444 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Baron v. United States, 295 F.2d 936 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Wright v.
United States, 279 F.2d 517 (Ct. Cl. 1960); Davis v. United States, 295 F.2d 931 (Ct. Cl.
1961) ; Matson v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 283 (Ct. Cl. 1959) ; Dick v. United States, 169
F. Supp. 491 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Adaman Mut. Water Co. v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 658
(Ct. Cl. 1958) ; Herring v. United States, 162 F. Supp. 769 (Ct. Cl. 1958) ; Highland Park v.
United States, 161 F. Supp. 597 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Sneed v. County of Riverside, 32 Cal. Rep.
318, 8 Av. Cas. 17, 766 (1963); Trippe v. Port of New York Authority, 236 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1962); Thornburg v. Port of Portland, supra note 86; Griggs v. Allegheny County, 402
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most of these actions have arisen from flights at low altitudes, usually in
the course of take-off or landing, enroute flights at altitudes, in excess of
500 feet have been held to constitute a taking when they in fact dimin-
ished the value of the subjacent property."8
The contribution of Causby in clarifying the rights and liabilities
created by aircraft noise cannot be overstated. The Court made final
pronouncement on the limitation of a property-owner's rights in the
superadjacent airspace, sought to define the relative rights of property
owners and operators of aircraft, and sustained a type of action adequate
to vindicate the property-owner's rights.8"
THE Griggs DECISION
A major question unresolved by Causby was the identity of the
party to be held liable for a taking. Brief analysis will unearth three
possibilities: the owners of the overflying aircraft, the operator of the
airport at which they are landing or taking off, and the United States,
which controls the paths and altitude of aircraft 0 In Causby, this prob-
lem did not arise, as the aircraft were government-owned, were landing
and departing from a government-operated airport, and were controlled
by a government-operated control tower. All three possible defendants
were thus combined in one party. The problem is presented only in the
case of a taking caused by the noise of privately-owned civil aircraft,
operating to or from a privately-owned (or municipally-owned) civil air-
port, and controlled by a government control tower. This remaining
question came to the court in Griggs v. Allegheny County."
Pa. 411, 168 A.2d 123 (1961), rev'd 369 U.S. 84 (1962) ; Gardner v. Allegheny County, 382
Pa. 88, 114 A.2d 491 (1955) ; Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664
(1960).
88. Thornburg v. Port of Portland, supra note 86. See Weisberg v. United States, 193
F. Supp. 815 (D. Md. 1961) ; Aaron v. United States, supra note 87.
89. Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 8 Av. Cas. 17, 107 (Cal. App.
1964); Eubank, Judicial Determination of Rights in Airspace, 51 Dick. L. REV. 161 (1947);
Klein, Cujus est Colum ejus est . . . Quousque Tandem?, 26 J. Am L. 237 (1959); Leavitt,
The Landowner versus the Airport, 50 W. VA. L. REV. 145 (1947); Mace, Ownership of
Airspace, 17 CniN. L. REv. 343 (1948); Noel, Airports and Their Neighbors, 19 TENN. L.
REV. 563 (1946); Richardson, Private Property Rights in the Air Space at Common Law,
31 CAN. B. REv. 117 (1953); Notes: 4 N.Y.L.F. 351 (1958); 13 WAsN. & LEE L. REv. 109
(1956); 35 COLUM. L. REV. 110 (1947); 14 J. AmR L. 112 (1947); 22 NoTRE DAME LAW.
228 (1947); 21 Tm"ra. L.Q. 62 (1947); 26 NEB. L. REV. 123 (1946); 8 MD. L. REV. 300
(1944).
90. An oversimplification of the exact role of the federal government. Aircraft flying
IFR (under Instrument Flight Rules) fly on airways and at altitudes assigned by the
Federal Aviation Agency's Air Traffic Control. But pilots flying VFR (under Visual Flight
Rules) may fly on such courses and at such altitudes as they choose, above the floor of
navigable airspace. During landing and takeoff the course and altitude of aircraft is also
assigned by Air Traffic Control, if an FAA tower is located at the airport, but such control
towers exist at only 272 of the nation's 8084 civil airports. The government thus controls
only a small portion of all flight. However, it controls most of it in the vicinity of the
nation's major metropolitan airports, which are the source of most noise complaints.
91. 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
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Griggs was one of a number of property owners residing within
several thousand feet of the end of a runway at the Greater Pittsburgh
Airport, owned and operated by Allegheny County, at a point where the
glide slope was fifteen to thirty feet above their chimneys, and who
alleged a "taking" resulting from depreciation in the value of their
property.92 A Board of Viewers found a taking by the county, and
awarded Griggs 12,690 dollars. The court of common pleas affirmed. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, holding that "there has been no
taking of the plaintiff's property by the County of Allegheny. . . ." The
court suggested that "he should look for relief to the owners or operators
of the aircraft which have made the complained of flights through the air-
space above his land."93 The decision was in square conflict with Acker-
man v. Port of Seattle,94 which held that the airport owner was liable for
the diminution in property values caused by aircraft noise, saying that
"Clearly, an adequate approach way is as necessary a part of an airport
as is the ground on which the airstrip, itself, is constructed . . .,,"
Before the United States Supreme Court, on Griggs' petition for a
writ of certiorari, the county, joined by the Airport Operators Council as
amicus curiae, argued that though there was a taking, someone other than
respondent was the taker, namely, the airlines or the C.A.A. acting as an
authorized representative of the United States. 6 The Court said:
We think, however, that respondent, which was the promoter,
owner, and lessor of the airport, was in these circumstances the
one who took the air easement in the constitutional sense. Re-
spondent decided, subject to the approval of the C.A.A., where
the airport would be built, what runways it would need, their
direction and length, and what land and navigation easements
would be needed. The Federal Government takes nothing; it is
the local authority which decides to build an airport vel non,
and where it is to be located. We see no difference between its
responsibility for the air easements necessary for operation of
the airport and its responsibility for the land on which the run-
ways were built ...
The glide path for the northeast runway is as necessary for the
operation of the airport as is a surface right of way for opera-
tion of a bridge, or as is the land necessary for the operation of
a dam .... Without the "approach areas," an airport is indeed
92. Gardner v. Allegheny County, 382 Pa. 88, 114 A.2d 491 (1955).
93. Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 402 Pa. 411, 168 A.2d 123 (1961).
94. 55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960).
95. See supra 348 P.2d at 666. See also 60 MIcn. L. REv. 98 (1961); 22 U. PTr. L.
REv. 786 (1961).
96. Accord, Harvey, Landowners' Rights in the Air Age: The Airport Dilemma, 56
Mica. L. REV. 1313 (1958); see Airplane Noise: Problem in Tort Law and Federalism, 74
HARV. L. REV. 1581 (1961); Comment, 57 Micn. L. REV. 1214 (1959).
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not operable. . . . Our conclusion is that by constitutional
standards it did not acquire enough. 7
The Court in effect took a three-dimensional view of an airport; in
addition to its latitude and longitude, it consists of airspace above the
ground, mushrooming out from the airport property to a distance suffi-
cient to include the glide paths leading to the runways. This airspace
overlying the airport's neighbors was, to the Court, a part of the total
property which an airport owner must acquire in order to engage in
business.
The holding of Griggs seems eminently correct. The considerations
against imposing liability on the federal government were well sum-
marized by the Court. Although the federal government may assist the.
development of an airport by construction grants and may add to the
safety of its operation by a control tower, it is the muncipality which
decides in the first instance whether it will have an airport, determines its
location and runway-layout, and which builds, owns and operates it. In
the usual case, it does so in a proprietary capacity, on a self-sustaining
basis, and sometimes at a profit. It is the operator's obligation to acquire
all property interests, whether in fee or easement, necessary to the opera-
tion of the business.
As a practical matter, a decision to impose liability on the owners of
the overflying aircraft would have presented the subjacent property-
owner with a totally ineffective remedy. The complaining owner in the
vicinity of any large airport would be required to observe and identify all
overflying aircraft for a long period, and to prove their altitude during
overflight. They would include the planes of many scheduled carriers,
irregular carriers, and commercial operators, military aircraft, and a large
number of privately-owned aircraft, many of which might overfly only
once. By the time he reached trial, the carriers might have drastically
altered their schedules and relative frequency of operations. Some might
have eliminated service to that point, or others might have commenced.
Any attempt to apportion the liability for a "taking" in these circum-
stances would be hopeless.
98
A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE
When the commercial jet aircraft commenced operations in October,
1958, the aircraft noise problem changed from an irritation into a serious
national problem. The civil jet transport not only generates twice the
noise of a piston aircraft, but its high-frequency pitch or "whine" is more
objectionable to the ears.99
97. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 89 (1962).
98. See 16 Sw. L.J. 346 (1962); 14 W. REs. L. REV. 376 (1963).
99. At the onset of the introduction of jet aircraft into commercial operations,
it was stated that the sound pressure level, as measured on a standard sound level
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Studies conducted by the Federal Aviation Agency have shown that
an aircraft noise level of 50 decibels produces widespread complaints,
and at 70 decibels produces "vigorous community action," and that
modern four-engine civil jet aircraft produce ground level pressure under
the flightpath of 110 decibels for a mile after take-off, 100 decibels for
over three miles, and 90 decibels for over 6 miles.' 00
The violent intensity and penetrating pitch of jet aircraft noise have
aroused anger and bitterness in communities adjacent to the nation's
large metropolitan airports. Congressional alarm at the mounting com-
plaints led to hearings by various subcommittees of the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and finally to approval, on August
23, 1961, of House Resolution 420,101 authorizing the Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee to conduct "a full and complete investiga-
tion and study of the problems involved in, and measures to minimize or
eliminate, aircraft noise nuisances and hazards to persons and property
meter, from jet aircraft was no greater than that from propeller-driven aircraft
and, hence, by implication, no noisier. However, experiments conducted in this
country and abroad definitely prove that with more appropriate measuring pro-
cedures than that of the standard sound level meter, such as perceived noise level,
the sound from a jet aircraft in communities immediately adjacent to airports
(approximately 2-3 miles from runway) would be subjected to about a 100-percent
increase in noisiness over that previously experienced from the typical propeller-
driven aircraft. This finding has been amply demonstrated in laboratory experiments
and field experiments and provides a partial explanation, at least, for the apparent
increased complaints and concern about aircraft noise.
One physical characteristic of sound that has primary importance to the human ear,
as Dr. Hubbard indicated, is that of spectrum, whether the sound is predominantly
of a high frequency or a low frequency, whether it is a high pitch or a low pitch.
High-pitched sounds are noisier, in general, than low-pitched sounds.
A second is bandwidth, that is, whether the sound energy is concentrated in a nar-
row band of frequencies or whether the energy is spread over a wide range of fre-
quencies; within limits the wider the bandwidth of a sound, the noisier it appears
to be.
Perhaps an analogy with how we see light will be helpful here. White light, as you
know, contains all of the colors. If you filter it, you get red and blue out of white.
Similarly, with sound, if you have all frequencies present, it is sometimes called
white noise; if you filter it, it takes on different characteristics in pitch.
Our noise environment has become more complicated in recent years with jet air-
craft because, in addition to having this general white noise characteristic, perhaps
shaped more in one frequency region than in the other, the jets now have strong
pure-tone components or "whines" that we hear.
This pure-tone factor, again regardless of what a person knows about the source,
or whether he is afraid of it, or whether it has a meaning to him, is found to be
more objectionable than the same amount of sound energy without the pure tone.
Testimony of Dr. Karl D. Kryter, Hearings Before Subcommittees of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 569 (1962).
See also, testimony of Bartholomew Spano, id. at 112. See also FAA, NOISE ABATEMENT
PLANNING SERIES, No. 3 (1960):
The more intense the sound, or higher the decibel level, the more likely it is to
produce annoyance. Also as a rule, high frequency or high-pitched noise is more
annoying than a low-pitched noise of the same decibel level. Because the turbojet
noise is in a higher frequency range, it will be more disturbing to a person than
noise caused by a piston engine aircraft of the same intensity. For example, a
turbojet engine at an 80-decibel level will sound as loud to the average person as a
piston engine operating at a 97-decibel level.
100. FAA, NOISE ABATEMENT PLANNeIN SERIES No. 3 (1960).
101. H.R. Res. 420, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 107 CONG. REc. 16263 (1961).
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on the ground." The subcommittees heard from complaining residents
in New York (Kennedy), San Francisco, Los Angeles and Chicago
(O'Hare), four centers of jet noise complaint. They received extensive
testimony of the effects of jet noise on the human system, including loss
of sleep, temporary loss of hearing, earaches, headaches, shock, children
screaming in the night, or falling from their beds in fright. Examples of
jet noise on community and social activities included interruption of
church services, substantial loss of classroom time and efficiency in
schools, inability to converse, telephone or entertain guests, and inter-
ference with television reception. Property damage included cracks in
walls and ceilings, separation of cabinets from walls, movement of stoves
and other gas appliances causing gas leaks, cracking and shifting of door
and window molding, cracking of exterior stucco, loosening or breaking
of fireplace bricks, and finally, a general deterioration of property values
and inability to sell."°2 The Committee's final report'01 found that:
There is no evidence before the subcommittee of any permanent
physical injury to persons or extensive physical damage to
property as a direct result of noise created by civil aircraft.
[But] [t]here is ample evidence before the subcommittee that
the impact of aircraft-generated noise upon persons beneath or
near the flightpaths does interrupt the peace and quiet of home-
life, interferes with public assemblies, and seriously disrupts
the community life, which the citizens have a right to enjoy.
The Committee also found that although substantial federal and
private research was being conducted in a search for a more quiet jet
engine, no solution 'had yet been found. Indeed, the only significant noise
abatement advance yet made-the recently-introduced fan-jet engine-
had indeed reduced jet exhaust noise but, ironically, had increased the
compressor whine which many find more irritating than the exhaust
blast.1
0 4
And, although noise abatement regulations of the Federal Aviation
Agency providing for the use of preferential runways and for noise abate-
ment climb and turn procedures have ameliorated the problem in some
localities, the Committee concluded:
It appears to be the consensus that whatever aircraft noise relief
is obtainable through air traffic rules changes, that approach has
been pretty much exhausted. While further changes here or
there might bring some minor relief to a few people, this possi-
bility can no longer be viewed as a major aircraft noise abate-
ment tool.'
102. Hearings, supra note 101 at 133, 136, 147, 158, 232, 234, 272, 278.
103. H.R. REP. No. 36, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1963).
104. Id. at 8, 26.
105. Id. at 22.
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At the last session of the hearings, Chairman Oren Harris aptly sum-
marized the present status of the problem: 0 6
While piston-powered airplanes, like the railroads and horse-
less carriages that preceded them, generated their share of
noise complaints from disturbed citizens, it is only with the
advent of the jet age that noisy aircraft have become a major
problem. It is a complicated and vexing problem that so far has
defied solution ...
Unhappily, because of the complexities that beset us in our con-
templation of this problem, we cannot yet feel that we are close
to any final answer. The continuing flood of noise complaints is
eloquent testimony to that fact ...
I would like to say that when I use the word "solution," I do so
recognizing that there is no such thing in the offing, although a
lot of study and thought has gone into it. No engine that can
propel a heavy aircraft at speeds of many hundreds of miles per
hour can be absolutely silent.
We are not going to ground the planes and we are not going to
shut down our airports. We are committed to a national, and
indeed an international, system of air transportation. This is of
paramount importance, from the standpoints of our commercial
growth and our national defense.
At the same time, however, the Congress has recognized that
our citizens are entitled to the quiet enjoyment of their homes.
Church services and school sessions should be carried on with as
little interference from outside noise as is possible in our society.
Clearly, then, we are dealing with a situation in which I do not
feel that we have .any possibility of pleasing everybody. Our
problem is to search for a balancing of the interests of those
involved. That includes the householders, travellers, carriers,
and all the rest.
This viewpoint, though accurate and fair, has not appeased those
affected by jet aircraft noise. They have proceeded from local complaint
to demands for congressional action and, finally, to litigation. Recently,
suit was filed by 809 persons against the operator of Kennedy Airport,10 7
by approximately 200 persons at Tampa, 08 and over 300 at Seattle.0 9
The National Aircraft Noise Abatement Council has collected information
on 161 pending or recent actions, involving 1469 plaintiffs, in addition to
260 pending claims, and 194 additional suits threatened." Nor will this
106. Hearings, supra note 101 at 493-4.
107. Trippe v. Port of New York Authority, 236 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1962).
108. Alfonso v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 308 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1962).
109. Martin v. Port of Seattle, 8 Av. Cas. 17, 507 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1962).
110. 1 NANAC, LEGAL NOTES 1 (1963). Since this compilation, approximately 1000 per-
sons have filed action against the City of Los Angeles, alleging property damage of $16
million. Aviation Daily, May 4, 1964.
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be all; in addition to present property owners who are affected but have
not yet commenced suit, additional groups will be affected in the future.
Although jets now serve 62 United States airports, in several years this
figure will be doubled. The Federal Aviation Agency has estimated that
100,000 property owners could be affected.'11
The potential liability for "takings" caused by jet noise presents a
serious problem to municipalities and other public airport owners.
Although they have not acquiesced in the philosophy of the Griggs deci-
sion, and continue to urge that the federal government assume the bur-
den,112 such a result appears unlikely. The Federal Airport Act authorizes
the Federal Aviation Agency to make matching grants to airport opera-
tors for "airport development," which is defined to include the cost of
acquisition of "any easement through or any interest in airspace, which is
necessary to permit any such work or to remove or mitigate or limit the
establishment of, airport hazards . ... ,18 But this legislation was
enacted in 1946, when the problem of jet noise was unforeseen, and before
the decisions in either Causby or Griggs. Thus, considerable doubt exists
whether grants for the acquisition of avigation easements would be
within the congressional intent. Senator Monroney, chairman of the
Senate Aviation Subcommittee, is of the opinion that such grants are
not authorized, and has said that
the law specifically provides that no funds will be allocated to
projects which are not directly related to safety (such as run-
ways, high intensity runway lighting, and runway distance
markers). Consequently, the Agency is precluded by law from
allocating Federal funds for the acquisition of land for the pur-
pose of noise abatement." 4
In any event, this question of statutory construction has never been
reached, for the Congress has heretofore limited the annual appropriation
for grants-in-aid to $75,000,000, a level sufficient only to enable matching
grants for designated safety items contained in the Agency's five-year
national plan for airport improvement. As a result, it has been the
Agency's consistent practice to contribute only to the acquisition of
clearance easements for the establishment of obstruction-free areas
extending not over 2,600 feet from the runway-end, but not to the aquisi-
111. N.Y. Times, March 6, 1962.
112. See testimony of Leander Shelley, General Counsel, Airport Operators Council,
Hearings Before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 664-67 (1962). See also Dygert, An Economic Approach to Aircraft Noise, 30 J. AiR
L. & Com. 207 (1964); Pogue & Bell, The Legal Framework of Airport Operations, 19 J.
Ant L. & COM. 253 (1952).
113. Federal Airport Act, 60 Stat. 170 (1946), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp.
V, 1961).
114. Letter From Senator Monroney to Mr. Frank Jovanevich, Seattle, Wash., March 14,
1962.
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tion of avigation easements, which might extend over six miles from the
runway. 115
Nor does congressional action to alter this situation appear likely.
The final report of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Commit-
tee, upon its investigation and study of aircraft noise problems, con-
cluded that:
Any enactment by the U.S. Congress to indemnify each and
every airport operator throughout the United States of America
against judgments which might be obtained or for moneys paid
over to claimants in the settlement of claims alleged under the
doctrine of the Griggs case would be impractical."'
At present no reliable estimate has been made, either of the total cost
of acquisition of avigation easements, or of the total liability for noise
"takings," which face the nation's airport operators. A 1956 air force
study of the cost of avigation easements to a distance of six miles from all
air force bases showed an estimated total cost of seven billion dollars,
"and I might say that we have a lot more airfields now than we had in
1956."" l As the nation's civil airports are located more closely adjacent
to centers of population, where surrounding properties are developed and
frequently highly valuable, it would be reasonable to assume that the
total civil liability would be greater.
Yet, the future may not be this dark. A number of considerations
have been presented which may substantially lessen the liability of air-
port operators. First, as time passes, claims become barred by the statute
of limitations. Not all jurisdictions have limited the period in which an
action for a constitutional "taking" may be commenced;" 8 but in those
which have done so, it has been held that the statute commences to run on
the date the "taking" occurred. This is not necessarily the day the airport
opened and aircraft commenced to fly, but the day on which noise became
sufficiently intense to impair the value of the subjacent property." 9 As
one court stated:
Unless there has been a significant depreciation in value or
115. At the time of the decision in Griggs v. Allegheny County, the county was com-
pleting a new runway, which would permit jet service at the airport. It advised the FAA
that it would not open the runway unless the Agency would agree to contribute to the
purchase of noise-abatement avigation easements or in any judgments entered against the
county. The Agency refused, and the county thereafter opened the runway without an
agreement to contribute. See Hearings, supra note 101, at 540.
116. H.R. REP. No. 36, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1963). See Note, 12 CATHOLIC U.L. REV.
65 (1963).
117. Testimony of Major General Albert M. Kuhfeld, Judge Advocate General, USAF,
Hearings Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 667-68 (1962).
118. See Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960).
119. Aaron v. United States, 311 F.2d 798 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Brin v. United States, 158
Ct. Cl. 387 (1962); Klein v. United States, 152 Ct. Cl. 208, 221 (1961).
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enjoyment of a property, this court has not considered the mere
advent of jet aircraft as the signal of a taking. 2 °
An airport from which piston aircraft have flown for many years without
incurring liability, or as to which suit is barred, may incur a new liability
on the date jet aircraft commence to operate, 2 ' or on the date when a
different type of aircraft, with lower landing and take-off characteristics,
commences to operate.
22
Second, a cause of action for a "taking" accrues in favor of the
owner at the time of taking, and does not pass to subsequent purchasers
of the property. The claim does not "run with the land." In actions
brought by subsequent purchasers, the courts have held that "if defend-
ant had already taken an easement before plaintiff acquired the property,
plaintiff would not be entitled to recover."' 2 While the seller of real
property might also assign his claim for the "taking" of an avigation
easement to the purchaser, this is probably never in fact done, and by
virtue of the Assignment of Claims Act, cannot be done with respect to
claims for taking caused by military aircraft.
124
Third, the measure of damages is the diminution in value at the time
of taking. Most airports were originally built in agricultural areas,
removed from residential developments. But as the community increased
in size, or perhaps because attracted by the airport, residential develop-
ment eventually reached and surrounded the airport. But the Supreme
Court has said that the diminution of value must be measured against
"the highest and most profitable use for which the property is adaptable
and needed or likely to be needed in the resonably near future .... ,125
And, "ordinarily, the highest and best use for property sought to be con-
demned is the use to which it is subjected at the time of taking."' 26 If an
airport takes an avigation easement over agricultural land, this is what it
120. Jensen v. United States, 305 F.2d 444 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
121. Jensen v. United States, 305 F.2d 444 (Ct. Cl. 1962) ; Davis v. United States, 295
F.2d 937 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Bacon v. United States, 295 F.2d 936 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Wilson v.
United States, 151 Ct. CL. 271 (1960) ; Adaman Mut. Water Co. v. United States, 181 F.
Supp. 658 (Ct. Cl. 1958) ; Highland Park v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 597 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
122. Herring v. United States, 162 F. Supp. 769 (Ct. Cl. 1958) ; Avery v. United States,
No. 192-60, Ct. Cl., April 17, 1964; Note, 41 TEXAs L. REV. 827 (1963).
123. Highland Park v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 597 (Ct. Cl. 1958). See also Aaron
v. United States, 311 F.2d 798 (Ct. Cl. 1963) where the court stated that parcel 27 was not
owned by the plaintiffs Raymond W. and Betty N. Morrett in February 1952 and, there-
fore, these plaintiffs would have no standing to assert a claim with respect to the taking of
an avigation easement over this parcel in February 1952, since such a claim would have
vested in the owner of the land at that time and would not have passed to Mr. and Mrs.
Morrett by virtue of the subsequent conveyance of parcel 27 to them. In this connection,
Griggs had sold his property before final decision in Griggs v. Allegheny County, but there
was no substitution of plaintiffs on that event; Griggs continued to maintain the action.
124. Herring v. United States, 162 F. Supp. 769 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
125. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934); Cameron Dev. Co. v. United
States, 145 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1944).
126. United States v. Buhler, 305 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1962).
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must pay for; not for a diminution in value of later residential prop-
erty.127 Indeed, the court of claims has held that an avigation easement
works no diminution in value to agricultural property. 28
Fourth, although overflights may lessen the value of property, an
adjacent airport also increases it. Opportunities are created for sale to
persons who are employed at the airport, or for the commercial develop-
ment which is attracted to the airport. In assessing the damage caused
to property values by an adjacent airport, the court must also assess the
increase in value which this has created. In some instances, there is no
net reduction, for
the detriment to the value of the commercial property by the
passage of the planes over it is approximately offset by the
enhancement of its value by the proximity of the field. It is the
proximity of the field that causes the planes to pass over this
property and impair its value, and it is the proximity of the
field that creates a greater demand for the property and thus
tends to enhance its value. One about offsets the other.
129
Fifth, the measure of damages for a taking is somewhat limited.
Recovery is measured solely by the amount of diminution in value. It
does not include elements which might be recoverable in other actions for
damages, such as the irritation or physical injury caused by noise, vibra-
tion, fear, nervousness, smoke or fumes. 3 °
Sixth, and perhaps most important, is the effect of Batten v. United
States,' which held that a property owner was not entitled to recover
for a "taking" if the offending aircraft did not invade the column of
airspace above the plaintiff's property." 2 The holding seems unsound.
It cannot be dismissed as a case involving only consequential damage, as
the trial court found a diminution in value of from $4,700 to $8,800-
from 40.8 per cent to 55.3 per cent-in the ten homes involved. As the
Supreme Court of Oregon said, in holding to the contrary:
It is a sterile formality to say that the government takes an
easement in private property when it repeatedly sends aircraft
directly over the land at altitudes so low as to render the land
127. Jensen v. United States, 305 F.2d 444 (Ct. C1. 1962).
128. United States v. 357.25 Acres, 55 F. Supp. 46 (W.D. La. 1944). See Pope v. United
States, 173 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
129. Dick v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 491 (Ct. Cl. 1959). But see United States v.
158.76 Acres, 298 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1962). See Roberts v. The Queen, 4 Av. Cas. 17,901
(Can. Exch. 1955); Walther, The Impact of Municipal Airports on Market Value of Real
Estate in the Adjacent Areas, 22 THE APPRAISAL J. 15 (1954); 20 J. AIa L. & COM. 440
(1953).
130. Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962) ; Pope v. United States, 173
F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Tex. 1959); Freeman v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla.
1958) ; United States v. 26.07 Acres, 126 F. Supp. 374 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
131. 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962).
132. See Nunnally v. United States, 239 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1956).
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unusable by its owner, but does not take an easement when it
sends aircraft a few feet to the right or left of the perpendicular
boundaries (thereby rendering the same land equally unusable).
The line on the ground which marks the landowner's right to
deflect surface invaders has no particular relevance when the
invasion is a noise nuisance. 138
Recently the Batten holding has been adopted by the court of claims,
18 4
and has been rejected by the Supreme Court of Washington.'85 In Avery,
the court awarded compensation to a group of landowners designated
as "Group A ... located within the approach zone of the runway . . ."
but denied compensation to "Group B," located within the traffic pattern,
but not in the approach zone. The court said:
Group B, made up of parcels 23, 25 and 32, while located within
the confines of the traffic pattern described in finding 9, is not
(with the exception of parcel 32) located within the approach
zone of the western end of the Runway 9-27. While the other
Group B parcels (parcels 23 and 25) suffer from the same general
effects of overflights as do the parcels of Group A, they are not
subject to takeoff and landing operations occurring directly
overhead; both parcels being at least 17,000 feet south of the
center line of the runway.
This holding, aside from its paucity of reasoning, seems to lead
to capricious results, and to be inconsistent within itself. An "approach
zone" is an inexact area, extending from the end of the runway to the
point where the angle of glide slope intersects the procedure turn
altitude, and where the outer marker is located. It may extend four
to seven miles from the end of the runway, and be of such width as
local airport officials may determine. The decision in Avery makes the
right to compensation a variable one, differing at different airports. Fur-
ther, the zone is wide enough to include property owners who are located
sufficiently removed from the center line that they do not experience
direct overflights, to a greater extent than property owners not in the
approach zone but under the traffic pattern.
In Martin v. Port of Seattle,'36 the court divided the claimants into
three classes, "Group A" subject to direct overflights, "Group B" as to
which evidence of overflight was in conflict, and "Group C" which suffered
no overflights. In holding all three groups entitled to compensation, the
court expressly rejected the Batten holding, saying:
133. Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962). See also
Mock v. United States, 8 Av. Cas. 18,080 (Ct. Cl. 1964); Davis v. United States, 8 Av. Cas.
18,075 (Ct. Cl. 1964); Anderson, Some Aspects of Airspace Trespass, 27 J. Ani L. & Com.
341 (1960).
134. Avery v. United States, supra note 122.
135. Martin v. Port of Seattle, Wash. (April 23, 1964).
136. Ibid.
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This requirement, that a landowner show a direct overflight as
a condition precedent to recovery of the damages to his land, is
presently stressed by some federal courts in construing the
"taking" as contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution. Batten v. United States (10th Cir. 1962),
306 F.(2d) 580. We are unable to accept the premise that re-
covery for interference with the use of land should depend upon
anything as irrelevant as whether the wing tip of the aircraft
passes through some fraction of an inch of the airspace directly
above the plaintiff's land. The plaintiffs are not seeking recovery
for a technical trespass, but for a combination of circumstances
engendered by the nearby flights which interfere with the use
and enjoyment of their land.
The Federal Aviation Agency has found that the modern four-
engine civil jet transport, after take-off, casts a 100 decibel overpressure
on the land beneath to a lateral width of one-half mile on either side of
the flight path, to a distance of over three miles from take-off.137 Thus,
lateral noise may diminish the value of subjacent property as much as
vertical noise. Although the holding in Batten seems unrealistic 18 in
the light of the practicalities of jet noise effects, certiorari was denied
by the Supreme Court, -9 and it would appear to be the federal rule, at
least for the present.
All of these, added together, arm the airport operator with sub-
stantial defenses to his potential liability. As the House Committee sum-
marized its recent hearings:140
A wide divergence of opinion exists with respect to the extent
of the financial impact which the Griggs decision may have
upon the cost of operating a civil air terminal (p. 720). Some of
these fears should be partially allayed by the recent refusal by
the U.S. Supreme Court to grant a writ of certiorari in the
matter of Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir.
1962); cert. den., 371 U.S. 955 (1963). In the Batten case
the owner of property adjacent to the flightpath, but not directly
under the flightpath as in the Griggs case, attempted to recover
compensatory monetary damages for aircraft noise and nui-
sance. Furthermore, effective defenses have been revised to suc-
cessfully resist these actions.
Their final validity remains for the future to determine. Indeed, not even
the basic question of the property owner's rights above the minimum
137. FAA, NOISE ABATEMENT PLANNING SERIES, No. 3 (1960).
138. See 16 VAND. L. REV. 430 (1963); 47 MI. L. REv. 889 (1963); 2 WASHBUmR L.J.
272 (1963).
139. 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
140. H.R. REP. No. 36, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1963). See also Morton, Some Real
Property Aspects of Avigation, 35 NEB. L. REV. 277 (1955); 12 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 65
(1963).
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altitudes of flight has been settled with finality.141 Present aircraft have
not required resolution of this problem, but the planned 1970 introduc-
tion of the Mach 3 supersonic commercial jet transport, with sonic boom
capability, may revive it.142 Causby and Griggs added greatly to a
definition of the relative legal rights of the airport and its neighbors, but
many issues remain for future resolution.
141. See Thornburg v. Port of Portland, supra note 133, holding that a property owner
has a cause of action for a "taking" caused by overflights above 500 feet; Matson v. United
States, 171 F. Supp. 283 (Ct. CI. 1959); Avery v. United States, supra note 122, holding
that he does not; and Aaron v. United States, 311 F.2d 798 (Ct. Cl. 1963), saying that the
question is not resolved.
142. Hopkins & McIntosh, Is Sonic Boom an Explosion?, 408 INs. L.J. 15 (1957) ; Roth,
Sonic Boom; A Definition and Some Legal Implications, 25 J. Am L. & Com. 68 (1958).
